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BACKLASH BLUNDERS: OBERGEFELL AND THE EFFICACY OF 
LITIGATION TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 
Adam Deming∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2015, exactly two years after it invalidated key por-
tions of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in United States v. 
Windsor, the Supreme Court issued its historic 5-4 ruling in Obergefell 
v. Hodges, holding that same-sex couples could no longer be barred 
from exercising the fundamental right to marriage.1  For marriage-
equality supporters, this judicial victory represented “the culmination 
of decades of litigation and activism.”2  The gathering outside of the 
Supreme Court at the time of the ruling exuded an attitude of jubila-
tion that spread throughout the country, as same-sex couples gath-
ered in various cities to publicly celebrate the decision and, in many 
cases, to exercise their newly protected right to marry.3  Supporters of 
the Supreme Court’s holding also took to social media, as twenty-six 
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 1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). 
 2 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-
marriage.html?_r=0. 
 3 Id. (collecting photos of “supporters of same-sex marriage gathered outside the Supreme 
Court”); Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rules Gay Couples Nationwide Have a Right to Marry, 
WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gay-marriage-
and-other-major-rulings-at-the-supreme-court/2015/06/25/ef75a120-1b6d-11e5-bd7f-
4611a60dd8e5_story.html (“A sea of cheering, rainbow flag-waving people filled the side-
walk in front of the Supreme Court to celebrate the decision.”); Supreme Court Rules on 
Gay Marriage—Highlights, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/live/
supreme-court-rulings/?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=a-lede-package-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news (reporting on reactions to the decision 
around the country). 
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million Facebook users applied the now famous rainbow filter to 
their profile pictures, while over six million tweets, including a widely 
circulated one from President Barack Obama, used the hashtag 
“#lovewins” to show support for the decision.4 
The tenor of public discourse regarding the ruling was not entire-
ly celebratory, however.  Some who opposed the outcome feared for 
their religious freedoms, and a few states even delayed the issuance of 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.5  Several commentators on 
both sides of the aisle also gave less than optimistic forecasts for the 
decision’s impact, warning of the impending social and political 
backlash that was sure to follow.6  Explanations for this imminent 
backlash differed: while some openly drew comparisons to the nega-
tive public reactions that followed past important divisive cases, such 
as Roe v. Wade and Brown v. Board of Education,7 others more simply at-
tributed the approaching wave of backlash to frustration over the 
Court’s lack of democratic legitimacy compared to the other branch-
 
 4 Heather Kelly, Facebook Rainbow Profiles Used by 26 Million, CNN: MONEY (June 30, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/29/technology/facebook-rainbow-profile/ (“Rainbows 
spread quickly all over Facebook this weekend to celebrate the Supreme Court decision 
that legalized same-sex marriage.”); Kerry Flynn, How #LoveWins on Twitter Became the Most 
Viral Hashtag of the Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/how-lovewins-twitter-became-most-viral-hashtag-same-sex-
marriage-ruling-1986279 (describing the meteoric rise in popularity of the “#loveWins” 
hashtag after President Obama used it on Twitter). 
 5 Elliot C. McLaughlin, Despite Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, Spasms of Resistance Persist, CNN 
(June 30, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/us/same-sex-marriage-supreme-
court-ruling-holdouts/ (quoting governmental officials who opposed the decision and 
describing how state governments in Alabama and Louisiana initially delayed enforce-
ment of the Court’s ruling). 
 6 See, e.g., John Culhane, The Gay Marriage Fight Isn’t Over, POLITICO (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/gay-marriage-legal-backlash-119468 
(“[This] decision will supply a hefty dose of oxygen to efforts already underway in red 
state legislatures to continue to deny marriage rights to gay couples.”); Scott Wyant, Let 
the Backlash Begin, DAILY KOS (July 5, 2015), http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2015/7/5/1399416/-Let-the-Backlash-Begin (outlining the Arkansas government’s re-
sistance to the ruling, including statements from members of the state legislature, and 
opining that this represents the beginning of a long period of backlash). 
 7 See, e.g., Culhane, supra note 6 (“In some ways, this new chapter of the gay marriage fight 
will likely mirror abortion rights in the wake of Roe v. Wade—a right technically legal but 
frustratingly difficult to exercise in many corners of the country.”); Michael C. Dorf, Will 
the Supreme Court’s Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Face “Massive Resistance”?, JUSTIA VERDICT 
(June 30, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/06/30/will-the-supreme-courts-same-
sex-marriage-ruling-face-massive-resistance (“Segregationists in the South (joined by some 
in the North) responded to Brown with a campaign of ‘massive resistance’. . . . [I]t is easy 
to imagine a campaign of, if not massive resistance, then at least substantial resistance to 
the Court’s [same-sex marriage] ruling.”). 
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es.8  Notables among this latter group included the dissenting Justic-
es, who uniformly decried the majority’s decision as a usurpation of 
the legislature’s role in democratic governance.9  Chief Justice John 
G. Roberts, Jr., stressed this theme early in his dissent, stating: “Five 
lawyers have closed the debate and enacted their own vision of mar-
riage as a matter of constitutional law.  Stealing this issue from the 
people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a 
dramatic social change that much more difficult to accept.”10 
Despite gloomy forecasts and initial rumblings of red state re-
sistance, any hints of outright defiance quickly fizzled.  In multiple 
states where the decision struck down existing marriage laws, Repub-
lican officeholders nevertheless issued public statements of intent to 
comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling, despite expressing personal 
disagreement with the Court’s holding.11  Contrary to earlier state-
ments threatening to postpone the issuance of marriage licenses, by 
June 29, 2015, a mere three days after the ruling, every state was issu-
ing marriage licenses in compliance with the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion.12 
With the notable exception of one defiant county clerk capturing 
media attention,13 the country quickly adjusted to a new mode of 
business as usual—one where states willingly granted marriage licens-
es to the couples who sought them, regardless of sex.  All but the de-
cision’s most persistent detractors fell out of the spotlight relatively 
quickly, and public opinion in favor of same-sex marriage remained 
 
 8 See David Post, A Few Words on Obergefell and the Countermajoritarian Tendency, WASH. 
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/29/a-few-words-on-obergefell-and-the-
countermajoritarian-tendency/ (arguing that the Obergefell decision “will come back to 
bite us” because it effectively excludes opponents of gay marriage from the political pro-
cess and delegitimizes their world view). 
 9 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611–26, 2626–31, 2631–40, 2640–43 (2015) (Rob-
erts, C.J. & Scalia, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting separately). 
 10 Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 11 McLaughlin, supra note 5 (“Most states where same-sex marriage was outlawed before 
Friday . . . saw their governors or attorneys general promise to abide by the ruling, though 
many made it clear they didn’t care for it.”). 
 12 Jacob Koffler, The Last Holdout Has Now Issued Gay Marriage Licenses, TIME (June 29, 2015), 
http://time.com/3940330/gay-marriage-louisiana/ (“The last state holding out on issu-
ing marriage licenses to same-sex couples after Friday’s historic Supreme Court ruling has 
relented.”). 
 13 See Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over Deal on Same-Sex Mar-
riage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-
same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0 (reporting on Kim Davis, a county clerk in Kentucky who 
was jailed after “defying a federal court order to issue licenses to gay couples”). 
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stable.14  This seemingly smooth transition raises the question: where 
is the backlash?  If this decision is comparable to Roe and Brown, why 
aren’t protestors gathered outside of the county clerks’ offices where 
marriage licenses are issued, and where is the “Traditional Marriage 
Manifesto?”15 
The simple answer is that the Obergefell decision has not caused 
and will not incite a major backlash.  This Comment will explore sev-
eral of the reasons why the predicted backlash will never come to fru-
ition.  Part I will briefly recount the history of litigation leading up to 
Obergefell, describing how the unique road that led to the decision 
had the effect of reducing future resistance to it.  Part II will discuss 
some of the most prominent backlash frameworks and how backlash 
scholars have applied them to the struggle for same-sex marriage.  
Part III will use strands of the backlash literature to argue that Oberge-
fell is not a cause for alarm among those anxiously anticipating mas-
sive resistance.  Finally, Part IV will use Obergefell to challenge the con-
ventional wisdom that courts are extremely limited in their capacity 
to serve as an effective vehicle for significant social change. 
Though this paper aims toward inspiring a critical reexamination 
of some of the backlash literature, it also acknowledges the role that 
awareness of the phenomenon of backlash has played, motivating in-
stitutional learning and adaptation on the part of both litigators and 
courts that made the advances heralded by Obergefell possible.  I hope 
to show that, because of the Supreme Court’s institutional learning 
and the unique political accountability structure surrounding the ju-
dicial branch as compared to the other branches, the decision to pur-
sue social change in the Court is, at the very least, no less defensible 
than attempting to do so through the legislature.  In certain situa-
 
 14 David Boaz, Marriage’s Lonely Warrior, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 11, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/09/11/kim-davis-is-just-a-lonely-
gay-marriage-warrior (“Kim Davis is not a symbol of massive resistance.  Mostly she’s just a 
lonely warrior.”); Justin McCarthy, U.S. Support for Gay Marriage Stable After High Court Rul-
ing, GALLUP (July 17, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/184217/support-gay-marriage-
stable-high-court-ruling.aspx?g_source=SAME_SEX_RELATIONS&g_medium=topic&g_
campaign=tiles (explaining that the Court’s ruling on same-sex marriage “has not affect-
ed the way Americans feel about the issue”). 
 15 But see Statement Calling for Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell v. Hodges, AMERICAN 
PRINCIPLES PROJECT (Oct. 8, 2015), https://americanprinciplesproject.org/founding-
principles/statement-calling-for-constitutional-resistance-to-obergefell-v-
hodges%E2%80%AF/ (resisting the Court’s Obergefell opinion and calling on federal and 
state officials “to refuse to accept Obergefell as binding precedent”).  Unlike the Southern 
Manifesto, however, this seems to have generated relatively little mainstream attention or 
support. 
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tions, the Court will be a more efficient vehicle for such change.  
Obergefell may very well provide an example of one such scenario. 
I.  THE ROAD TO OBERGEFELL 
While the initial rumblings of the litigation battle over same-sex 
marriage began in the 1970s, resulting in a string of unsuccessful law-
suits,16 the movement started to gain real traction in 1993 with the 
first same-sex marriage victory in a court of last resort anywhere in 
the United States.17  In the case of Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court declared that withholding the right of marriage from same-sex 
couples constituted sex discrimination and thus presumptively violat-
ed the Hawaii Constitution.18  This historic ruling converted the idea 
of same-sex marriage from a distant ambition to a reality—surprising 
and, ultimately, mobilizing those on both sides of the controversy.19  
While the mobilization effect of Baehr among those opposed to same-
sex marriage was obvious, as they rapidly (and successfully) moved to 
quell the ruling via legislation in Hawaii and launch legislative cam-
paigns in a number of other states,20 the mobilizing effects were at 
first more diffuse for marriage-equality advocates.  Though solid data 
are unavailable, some assert that, by rendering same-sex marriage re-
alistic, Baehr had a unifying effect on the agenda of the gay rights 
movement, transforming this now attainable end into a uniform 
goal.21  Others argue that any agenda-setting effect largely arose as the 
 
 16 See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1102, 
1111 (1982) (affirming refusal to issue marriage license to same-sex couple applicants); 
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 
588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 
801, 810 (1972); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (denying that 
common law marriage applied to same-sex unions); Singer v. Hara, 552 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1974) (affirming refusal to grant marriage license to same-sex applicants).  Dan-
iel Pinello notes that one major reason these cases were unsuccessful was because they 
were brought by “[l]one couples, unsupported by organized lesbian and gay interests, 
[who] made ad hoc assertions of novel social and constitutional positions, often without 
the benefit of legal arguments orchestrated by seasoned advocates.”  DANIEL R. PINELLO, 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 23 (2006). 
 17 PINELLO, supra note 16, at 25. 
 18 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 54, 67–68 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a state marriage law, 
insofar as it was used to ban same-sex marriage, violated the state constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause, and was thus presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scru-
tiny upon remand). 
 19 PINELLO, supra note 16, at 25–30. 
 20 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 63–66, 68 (2013). 
 21 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Mar-
riage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 311–12 (2013). 
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result of the same-sex marriage movement necessarily taking a defen-
sive posture in response to the massive “anticipatory countermobiliza-
tion” that the Baehr decision incited across various states.22 
Either way, opponents of same-sex marriage struck first, and they 
struck hard.  A state constitutional amendment overturned the Ha-
waii ruling before any same-sex marriages could occur.23  Likewise, 
just three years after Baehr, in 1996, Congress passed DOMA, defining 
marriage as being between “one man and one woman,” removing the 
possibility of federal benefits for same-sex couples, and authorizing 
states to withhold recognition of same-sex marriages executed in oth-
er states.24  Over the course of the subsequent ten years, legislative 
campaigns across the United States would result in more than forty 
different states banning same-sex marriage via legislation or state 
constitutional amendment.25 
In 1999, the next major state ruling in favor of same-sex marriage 
emerged in Vermont.  Baker v. State determined that limiting mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples violated the state constitution’s equal 
protection provision.26  The Vermont Supreme Court delegated the 
creation of a remedy to the legislature, which found that civil unions 
would satisfy the state’s constitutional requirements, passing a bill 
that brought them into effect the following year.27  Though one 
prominent backlash scholar has characterized Baker as an ideal politi-
cal compromise, embodying “the values of tolerance and mutual re-
spect” in an otherwise gridlocked political environment,28 neither side 
seemed satisfied with the outcome.  Opponents of same-sex marriage 
repeatedly attempted to repeal the civil union legislation, while many 
marriage-equality advocates would soon see the civil union label as a 
 
 22 Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory Countermovement 
Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 449, 455, 461 (2014). 
 23 PINELLO, supra note 16, at 27.  It is worth noting, however, that “in the wake of Baehr, the 
state legislature in 1997 created a ‘reciprocal benefits’ law that granted limited relation-
ship rights to same-sex couples.”  Id. 
 24 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) (defining “marriage” as “a legal union between one man and one 
woman), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 
1738C (1996) (allowing states to deny giving effect to the same-sex marriages of other 
states in their own jurisdictions).  Collectivley, these statutes comprise the Defense of 
Marriage Act.  See also PINELLO, supra note 16, at 29. 
 25 PINELLO, supra note 16, at 29. 
 26 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 27 PINELLO, supra note 16, at 29–30. 
 28 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Un-
ions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 881 (2001). 
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form of “second-class citizenship,” despite the admitted progress that 
it embodied.29 
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court began to seriously 
weigh in on the debate with its landmark decision in Lawrence v. Tex-
as.  In a previous case, Romer v. Evans, the Court had condemned the 
“animosity” underlying a Colorado statute that foreclosed the possi-
bility of statutory protections based on sexual orientation.30  Echoing 
Romer, the Lawrence opinion held that moral disapproval was insuffi-
cient to justify the criminalization of homosexual activity, overturning 
its precedent from Bowers v. Hardwick.31  Though Justice Kennedy, 
who wrote the opinion, made it clear that the ruling had no effect on 
same-sex marriage rights,32 commentators noted that “he left little 
doubt where his (and the Court’s) sympathies lay.”33  Justice Scalia al-
so expressed incredulity regarding the self-imposed limitations on the 
holding, noting in his dissent that the reasoning of the majority left 
state same-sex marriage bans “on pretty shaky grounds.”34 
Despite Justice Kennedy’s disclaimer and the limited nature of the 
Lawrence holding, the decision had a serious impact on the movement 
for equal marriage rights.  For the first time, the same-sex marriage 
debate received sustained mainstream media attention.35  This spike 
in coverage of same-sex marriage was accompanied by a short-term 
backlash evidenced in public opinion data, as approval of same-sex 
marriage fell from 38% to 30% of the United States population in the 
months following the ruling.36 
 
 29 KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 77–79, 83; PINELLO, supra note 16, at 188. 
 30 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 634 (1996). 
 31 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 195–96 (1986), which held that due process did not protect any right of individuals 
to engage in sodomy, regardless of whether it took place in the privacy of one’s own 
home). 
 32 Id. at 578. 
 33 Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 22, at 455. 
 34 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the reasoning in Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence “leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples”); see also id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This case ‘does not in-
volve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle 
and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.”). 
 35 Nathaniel Persily et al., Gay Marriage, Public Opinion and the Courts 18, 20–23, (Penn Law 
Faculty Scholarship, Paper No. 91, 2006), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/
faculty_scholarship/91 (using polling data on approval of gay marriage collected by the 
Pew Research Center and number of mentions of gay marriage in news media to show a 
negative correlation between the two following the Lawrence decision).  
 36 Id. at 21.  The authors also noted that such “short-term” backlash is highly unusual, theo-
rizing that it arose here largely due to the combination of increased media coverage, rais-
ing the salience of a relatively new issue, and the statements made against same-sex mar-
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This decline continued in the aftermath of the next significant 
same-sex marriage state court decision, which occurred later that 
same year.37  In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court declared that its state constitution pro-
tected same-sex couples’ right to marry.38  Opponents of the ruling 
failed to gather the necessary support for any constitutional amend-
ment overturning the case at the subsequent constitutional conven-
tions.39  As a result, unlike its predecessor, Baehr, the Massachusetts 
holding led to the first actual same-sex marriages in the country.40  
The increased media attention to same-sex marriage continued into 
2004, as San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom unilaterally distributed 
over 4000 marriage licenses to same-sex couples, despite California’s 
2000 marriage statute that defined marriage as “between a man and a 
woman.”41  In the aftermath of the Newsom affair, the California Su-
preme Court invited a constitutional challenge to the 2000 statute.  
Thus, although San Francisco’s licenses were later invalidated, New-
som’s actions laid the groundwork for the 2006 case that would legal-
ize same-sex marriage in California.42 
These events on the state level brought same-sex marriage to the 
forefront of national politics.  In February of 2004, President George 
W. Bush endorsed a constitutional amendment to protect traditional 
marriage.43  Though the amendment failed to gain traction,44 one 
 
riage by political elites, who wouldn’t begin to come out in favor of marriage equality un-
til 2006.  Id. at 9, 25, 43. 
 37 Id. at 21. 
 38 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
 39   PINELLO, supra note 16, at 35, 56, 71.  The opposition’s failure to pass an amendment was 
not for lack of trying.  In the 2004 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, a DOMA 
amendment only failed to pass by a narrow margin before the majority, after days of de-
bate, settled on an amendment allowing civil unions.  This amendment required approval 
the following year as well in order to be introduced to Massachusetts voters on the ballot; 
however, after the 2004 elections yielded losses for same-sex marriage opponents and 
corresponding gains for advocates, the civil union amendment failed by a landslide in the 
2005 Constitutional Convention.  Id. 
 40 Id. at 68–72. 
 41 Id. at 74 (discussing the distribution of marriage licenses during the period referred to in 
the Bay Area as the “Winter of Love”); see also Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of 
Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1172 (2009) 
(describing how Newsom acted “unilaterally” in issuing marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples during that time); Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5 (West 2000) (recognizing “only mar-
riage between a man and a woman”). 
 42 Schacter, supra note 41, at 1172 (“The California Supreme Court ultimately invalidated 
the Newsom-era marriages, but it left the door open for the constitutional challenge to 
the California ban on same-sex marriage that was later filed.”) (citing Lockyer v. City of 
San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 464, 494–95 (Cal. 2004)). 
 43 PINELLO, supra note 16, at 20 (explaining the proposed “Federal Marriage Amendment”). 
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backlash scholar also credits President Bush’s electoral victory in the 
2004 presidential race in large part to his stance against same-sex 
marriage in the aftermath of Goodridge.45  Other commentators have 
pointed out, however, that many issues—for instance, national securi-
ty and terrorism—took a more central role in the election, and that 
any gains President Bush experienced because of his stance on mar-
riage were modest at best.46 
Goodridge and the surrounding events did have their own fairly dis-
tinct national backlash, however.  While there had only been three 
states with constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage 
prior to 2004, over the subsequent three years, twenty-six additional 
states would pass constitutional amendments restricting marriage to 
opposite sex couples only.47  Some of these amendments were also 
worded strongly enough to block future civil union legislation.48 
Despite these effects, once the same-sex marriage debate again 
found itself on the media backburner in 2006, favorable public opin-
ion recovered to its pre-Lawrence point and resumed its steady climb.49  
Moreover, public opinion toward civil unions improved dramatically 
over this period, with a gain of almost ten percentage points in favor 
of civil unions (and a corresponding decrease in those opposed) 
from 2004 to 2006.50  This rise in favorable opinion corresponded to 
an increase in legislation allowing civil unions, as thirteen states and 
the District of Columbia had passed civil union or domestic partner-
ship laws by 2009.51 
Civil union laws did not prevent several states from eventually al-
lowing full same-sex marriage rights in the coming years.  Significant 
litigation victories in Connecticut and California legalized same-sex 
 
 44 Id. (“The Federal Marriage Amendment failed by substantial margins in both houses of 
Congress in 2004.”). 
 45 Michael Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 467 
(2005). 
 46 See PINELLO, supra note 16, at 179–80 (examining survey data concerning the impact of 
President George Bush’s stance against same-sex marriage on voters and finding that it 
had “relatively modest” effects). 
 47 Schacter, supra note 41, at 1188–89. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Persily et al., supra note 35, at 21–23. 
 50 Id. at 40–41 (discussing the effects of different survey formats on public opinion regard-
ing civil unions, concluding that civil unions became more popular during this period re-
gardless of question wording, and explaining this increase by reference to political elites’ 
expression of approval for civil unions as a political compromise); see also PINELLO, supra 
note 16, at 182 (“[F]ull civil unions with all the rights and responsibilities of marriage in-
stantly became the political fallback position after the [Goodridge] ruling.”). 
 51 See Schacter, supra note 41, at 1189–90 (noting that of the thirteen states with civil union 
or domestic partnership laws, only two “had acted under judicial compulsion”). 
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marriage within those states in 2008,52 though the California case was 
overturned shortly thereafter when the state passed Proposition 8, re-
stricting marriage to one man and one woman by popular vote.53  In 
2009, an Iowa Supreme Court decision, Varnum v. Brien, legalized 
same-sex marriage, and several other states began guaranteeing equal 
marriage rights via statutes,54 as public opinion favoring marriage 
equality continued to climb.55  Indeed, by 2011, Maine, Vermont, New 
Hampshire, New York, and the District of Columbia had passed legis-
lation conferring full marriage rights upon same-sex couples.56 
Localized backlash was also a consistent theme throughout this 
period.  In addition to Proposition 8 in California, a ballot initiative 
overturned the Maine marriage-equality legislation, and Iowa voters 
removed the judges from office who had voted in favor of same-sex 
marriage in Varnum.57  Nevertheless, national public opinion contin-
ued to march toward wider endorsement of same-sex marriage, as a 
2010 poll became the first to show a majority of the American public 
in favor of same-sex marriage rights.58  A steady drumbeat of cases 
promoting marriage equality also began to build in 2010, as federal 
courts started issuing rulings weighing against DOMA’s constitution-
ality,59 and a district court in California invalidated Proposition 8 on 
 
 52 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452–53 (Cal. 2008) (legalizing same-sex marriage 
in California until an amendment to the state constitution was passed), superseded by consti-
tutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 
407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (legalizing same-sex marriage in Connecticut). 
 53 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; see also Schacter, supra note 41, at 1190–91 (characterizing Prop-
osition 8 preparation as “pre-backlash” because it commenced before the In re Marriage 
Cases decision even came out, and describing how “Proposition 8 went on to pass with 
approximately 52% of the vote”) (internal citations omitted). 
 54 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); see Dorf & Tarrow, Bedfellows, supra note 22, at 456 (in 2009, 
“same same-sex marriage was made legal by legislation” in Maine and Vermont). 
 55 Schacter, supra note 41, at 1194 (“Moreover, public support for same-sex marriage ap-
peared to increase noticeably in 2009 . . . . [S]everal polls registered new levels of sup-
port.”). 
 56 Dorf & Tarrow, Bedfellows, supra note 22, at 456. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Opinion Research Poll at 3, CNN, (Aug. 11, 2010), 
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2010/images/08/11/rel11a1a.pdf; see also FREEDOM TO 
MARRY, CNN For the First Time, Poll Finds Majority Support for Freedom to Marry Nationwide 
(Aug. 2010), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/for-the-first-time-poll-finds-
majority-support-for-the-freedom-to-marry-nat (noting that the 2010 CNN poll was “the 
first national poll to show that a majority of Americans support the freedom to marry”). 
 59 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, 682 F.3d 1, 6 (1st. Cir. 2012) (noting 
DOMA inhibits same-sex married couples from enjoying the full benefits of marriage, 
such as being able to file joint federal tax returns); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012) appeal dismissed, 724 F.3d 1048, 1049–50 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (holding DOMA, as applied to the plaintiff, was unconstitutional); Dragovich 
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constitutional grounds—a ruling that would later be upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court.60 
President Obama also showed the first signs of changing the ex-
ecutive stance on the same-sex marriage issue during this period, as 
Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter to Speaker of the House 
John Boehner in early 2011 announcing that the administration 
would no longer defend the constitutionality of DOMA.61  The ad-
ministration’s new position fueled the increasing number of federal 
cases taking issue with DOMA’s constitutionality.62  President 
Obama’s views on marriage equality completed their “evolution” in 
2012, as the President came out in favor of same-sex marriage before 
winning re-election.63 
The following year yielded unprecedented gains for marriage-
equality advocates.  In 2013, six more states legalized same-sex mar-
riage.64  Additionally, the Supreme Court again issued rulings that 
weighed in on the same-sex marriage debate, although the majority 
continued to refuse to directly answer whether the Constitution safe-
guarded any right to same-sex marriage.65  Issuing twin opinions, the 
Supreme Court refused to overturn a California district court’s inval-
idation of Proposition 8 in Hollingsworth v. Perry, and declared key 
 
v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying a mo-
tion to dismiss the plaintiff’s lawsuit challenging DOMA). 
 60 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (invalidating Proposi-
tion 8 for “unconstitutionally burden[ing] the exercise of the fundamental right to marry 
and creat[ing] an irrational classification on the basis of sexual orientation”), aff’d, 591 
F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652(2013); Hol-
lingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (vacating the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance due to lack of stand-
ing, but leaving the district court’s judgment in effect). 
 61 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House 
of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-
general-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act. 
 62 See supra note 59 (listing cases challenging DOMA’s constitutionality). 
 63 See Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Says Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Legal, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/politics/obama-says-same-sex-
marriage-should-be-legal.html?_r=0 (describing the evolution of President Obama’s views, 
culminating in his endorsement of same-sex marriage rights). 
 64 See Dorf & Tarrow, Bedfellows, supra note 22, at 456 (“On January 1, [2013,] same-sex mar-
riage became legal in Maryland, as a result of changes approved in 2012.  Rhode Island, 
Delaware, Minnesota, Hawaii, and Illinois all followed with marriage equality statutes of 
their own, although the Illinois law does not go into effect until the middle of 2014.”). 
 65 See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (vacating the Ninth Circuit’s 
affirmance of a district court’s judgment invalidating Proposition 8 for lack of standing); 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683, 2695 (2013) (invalidating the portion of 
DOMA that defines marriage as between one man and one woman on Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause grounds). 
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portions of the federal Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional in 
United States v. Windsor.66 
Though critics such as Justice Scalia attacked Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion in Windsor for its lack of clarity,67 others have sug-
gested that the opinion’s ambiguity was intentional.68  The Supreme 
Court’s progressive but gradual approach seemed to provide a clear 
signal for lower courts to follow while allowing the Court to bide its 
time, await a potential circuit split and let the positive trend in favor-
able public opinion toward same-sex marriage continue, enabling any 
future marriage decision to better avoid backlash.69 
If there was an intentional signal, the lower courts seemed to have 
no trouble catching on, as the trickle of decisions against DOMA’s 
same-sex marriage ban grew into a cascade.70  In the two years be-
tween Windsor and Obergefell, there were four different circuit deci-
sions and over forty district court decisions that were favorable to same-
sex marriage.71 
To put the movement’s progress in perspective, before Windsor a 
total of nine states and the District of Columbia allowed same-sex 
marriages.72  By the time the Supreme Court decided Obergefell, a total 
of thirty-seven states already permitted same-sex marriages.73  Of the 
twenty-eight additional states that found marriage equality between 
the Supreme Court cases, five of them recognized same-sex marriage 
through legislation (Illinois, Hawaii, Delaware, Minnesota, and 
Rhode Island), while the other twenty-three granted same-sex mar-
riage rights through judicial decisions.74  One scholar described this 
 
 66 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683, 2695. 
 67 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s justifi-
cations behind its ruling as “rootless and shifting”). 
 68 Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage Equality Continued, 9 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S52, S56–58 (2015). 
 69 See id. at S58 (“If the outcome in Perry was an attempt by the Supreme Court to avoid 
backlash . . . then Windsor was the corollary . . . . Windsor may have been written the way 
that it was in order to create a circuit split on the state same-sex marriage bans, thus re-
turning to the court the very issue that it deferred in Perry.”). 
 70 See id. at S64–65 (describing the “flood of favorable district court decisions” that occurred 
post-Windsor). 
 71 Id. at S58–71.  In contrast, there were only four federal cases that disfavored same-sex 
marriage equality, including the Sixth Circuit case that created the circuit split and led 
the Supreme Court to take Obergefell under advisement.  Id. 
 72 See  L.A. Times Staff, Timeline: Gay Marriage Chronology, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2015) (tabu-
lating legalization of same-sex marriage across the states, along with causes of legalization 
between legislation and judicial order). 
 73 Julia Zorthian, These Are the States Where SCOTUS Just Legalized Same-Sex Marriage, TIME 
(June 26, 2015), http://time.com/3937662/gay-marriage-supreme-court-states-legal/. 
 74 See, e.g., L.A. Times Staff, supra note 72 (providing an interactive map tracking legislation 
and court decisions legalizing same-sex marriage across states leading up to Obergefell). 
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period as “one of the most remarkable flurries of constitutional litiga-
tion in American history.”75  During this period, favorable public 
opinion toward marriage equality also continued its persistent climb, 
moving from 54% to 60% of United States citizens approving of 
same-sex marriage leading up to Obergefell, without any significant de-
cline in the immediate aftermath of the decision.76  The Supreme 
Court’s strategy of moving alongside public opinion, neither falling 
too far behind nor stretching too far ahead of it, seems to reflect in-
stitutional learning from previous landmark cases and, perhaps, the 
scholarship surrounding backlash, which the next Part explores. 
II.  BACKLASH FRAMEWORKS 
Backlash in the judicial context can be defined broadly as the 
mobilization of political opposition against an adverse court ruling, 
the effect of which is to undermine either the ruling’s implementa-
tion or subsequent policy goals of the victor.77  Examples of judicial 
backlash include the passage of opposing legislation, the electoral 
removal of politicians who endorsed the ruling, or even outright re-
sistance to the ruling’s execution.78  Though much work has exam-
ined backlash as a broad political phenomenon, this Part will focus 
on the judicial context, exploring the frameworks of three prominent 
scholars who have sought to explain and predict backlash specifically 
in response to court decisions.  Importantly, each of these scholars 
has weighed in on the efficacy of the litigation strategy that marriage 
equality advocates have pursued as well.79 
 
 75 Watts, supra note 68, at S78. 
 76 McCarthy, supra note 14. 
77  See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 388–89 (2007) (reviewing the developing understanding of 
the term “backlash” and exploring how it has been applied to discussions of judicial deci-
sions). 
 78 See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA 
L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2010) (defining the backlash thesis as “the proposition that litigation 
does more harm than good for social change movements by producing countermobiliza-
tion that makes reform goals more difficult to achieve”).  Some scholars have convincing-
ly argued that examining this topic from the perspective of judges and advocates causes 
academics to miss key positive effects of backlash—namely, the popular constitutional di-
alogue that backlash inspires (and, to an extent, embodies).  See Post & Siegel, supra note 
77, at 373, 389–91.  In addressing the more judiciary-focused backlash literature and ar-
guing that litigants and judges perhaps should not be as fearful of backlash as the past 
scholarship would indicate, the present study necessarily adopts a similarly court-focused 
view.  However, the idea of backlash as a useful tool to rouse popular constitutional dia-
logue is one to which I will return in Part IV. 
 79 See also Eskridge, supra note 21, at 311–12 (arguing that same-sex marriage litigation has 
caused backlash, but concluding that the progress from litigation in this case has so far 
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The work of the first scholar, Gerald N. Rosenberg, proposes that 
courts, acting on their own, are a “hollow hope” for social movement 
progress due to several structural constraints.80  These constraints, 
which delimit the judiciary’s efficacy as an agent of social change, in-
clude (1) the limited nature of constitutional rights, (2) the judicial 
branch’s lack of independence from the influence of the other 
branches, and (3) the judiciary’s inability to implement its own deci-
sions.81  These limitations stymie the advancement of social move-
ments that use litigation strategies by either guaranteeing loss or off-
setting any judicial gains with the resulting countermobilization of 
opponents.82  Rosenberg thus argues that, in the absence of an ac-
companying political movement, litigation will be counterproductive 
to social movement goals.83 
Rosenberg released a critique of the same-sex marriage move-
ment’s litigation strategy in 2008, applying his criteria to Baehr, Baker, 
and Goodridge.84  Arguing that each decision more effectively mobi-
lized opponents than advocates, he asserted that “the political insula-
tion of the judiciary, the very attribute that allows the relatively disad-
vantaged to have their day in court, also limits the efficacy of judicial 
victories.”85  Rosenberg ascribes the same-sex marriage backlash (and 
backlash in general) to both a popular perception of courts as an an-
ti-democratic institution and their greater tendency, in the absence of 
direct political feedback, to flout public opinion in their rulings.86  He 
concludes that the marriage-equality campaign would have been bet-
ter off using its resources to pursue legislative change, or, if it insisted 
 
outweighed the detriment).  See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 339–415 (2d ed. 2008); KLARMAN, supra note 20, 
at 63–68. 
 80 ROSENBERG, supra note 79, at 430. 
 81 Id. at 10–21.  Rosenberg also discusses several conditions, at least one of which must be 
present for courts to overcome the implementation constraint for a given social cause.  
Id. at 30–35.  However, they are inapplicable to the same-sex marriage debate, as the im-
plementation constraint does not come into play.  Id. at 350–51.  They are therefore 
omitted from this discussion. 
 82 See id. at 83–84 (discussing how civil rights lawyers, despite their victory in Brown, were 
unable to overcome massive resistance to implementation of desegregation without the 
Court’s assistance from other branches). 
 83 Id. at 428–29. 
 84 Id. at 343–54. 
 85 Id. at 417.  Rosenberg elaborates further on this point, explaining that judges are more 
likely to act in the absence of political support than other governmental actors, thus in-
spiring backlash, due to this lack of political accountability.  Id. at 425–26. 
 86 Id. at 425–26. 
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on litigation, proceeding more gradually, targeting civil unions be-
fore attempting to attain full marriage rights.87 
Legal historian Michael Klarman, whose backlash scholarship 
could be described as the spiritual successor to Rosenberg’s “hollow 
hope” thesis, had a much rosier assessment of the same-sex marriage 
movement’s litigation strategy in his more recent evaluations.88  In his 
earlier work, Klarman argued that court decisions “produce back-
lashes for three principal reasons: They raise the salience of an issue, 
they incite anger over ‘outside interference’ or ‘judicial activism,’ and 
they alter the order in which social change would otherwise have oc-
curred.”89  Like Rosenberg’s explanation of backlash, Klarman’s 
framework rests on two pillars: his first and third reasons imply that 
judicial backlash arises because courts can more easily fall out of 
touch with public opinion than their more politically accountable 
governmental colleagues,90 while his second reason seems to attribute 
backlash to a supposedly popular view of courts as external, non-
democratic intermeddlers.91 Klarman concludes that the Supreme 
 
 87 Id. at 417–19. 
 88 See KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 218–19 (arguing that public opinion trends make the 
eventual legalization of same-sex marriage inevitable regardless of whether proponents 
choose a litigation or legislation strategy, though the latter would lead to less backlash 
along the way). 
 89 Klarman, supra note 45, at 473. 
 90 See id. at 474, 478–79 (noting, with regard to the salience point, that “Court rulings such 
as Lawrence and Goodridge forced people who previously had not paid much attention to 
gay-rights issues to notice what has been happening and to form an opinion on it,” and in 
reference to the order of social change, that Goodridge inspired backlash because it man-
dated marriage equality at a time when American public opinion had only just warmed 
up to civil unions and remained opposed to same-sex marriage). 
 91 See id. at 475 (“[B]ecause [Goodridge] was a court decision, rather than a reform adopted 
by voters or popularly elected legislators, critics were able to deride it as the handiwork of 
arrogant ‘activist judges’ defying the will of the people.”).  Whether this characterization 
of courts as “anti-democratic” serves as a mere rhetorical argument used by political 
elites, or itself represents a source of backlash, is left unclear in Klarman’s work.  In his 
earlier assessment of same-sex marriage, Klarman seems to imply both, though scholars 
evaluating his work have disagreed on this point.  Compare Post & Siegel, supra note 78, at 
392 n.91 (dismissing the implication in Klarman’s work that judicial activism is an inher-
ent source of backlash because “Klarman makes no serious effort to argue that there 
would be less backlash if Congress, rather than courts, were to have ended school deseg-
regation or abolished the crime of sodomy, and the common sense of the matter is surely 
to the contrary”) with David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? 
Evidence from a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 741–42, n.29 (2012) (con-
tending that Klarman is making an argument about the popular perception of judicial 
competency by presenting the rhetorical arguments against “judicial activism” as being 
successful).  In his more recent work, Klarman has stated, in reference to his assertion 
that judicial decisions can outpace public opinion, thereby causing backlash, that “[t]he 
point is not that court decisions generate greater backlash than identical legislative policy 
resolutions would have, but rather that courts may issue unpopular decisions that legisla-
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Court “rarely, if ever” serves as “the vanguard of a social reform 
movement” because it is too constrained by the threat of backlash to 
significantly deviate from public opinion.92  It can, however, attain 
symbolic victories by “constitutionaliz[ing] consensus and sup-
press[ing] outliers.”93 
Klarman’s more recent assessments of the same-sex marriage liti-
gation strategy and its capacity to overcome or bypass backlash have 
grown increasingly optimistic.  In his 2013 book on the subject, Klar-
man described the legalization of same-sex marriage as inevitable and 
predicted that it would most likely occur through a Supreme Court 
ruling.94  Notably, as one reviewer points out, though Klarman uses 
the same variables previously described to predict backlash, his tone 
and conclusion have changed, reflecting more positive appraisals of 
the efficacy of the marriage-equality movement’s litigation strategy.95  
While Klarman concluded in 2005 that same-sex marriage litigation 
had hurt more than it had helped the movement,96 in 2013 he drew 
the opposite conclusion.97  Nevertheless, Klarman cautioned that op-
position to same-sex marriage remained strong and that how the 
marriage-equality movement proceeded would affect the level of re-
sistance it encountered.98 
 
tures, confronting the same issue at the same time, would have avoided.”  KLARMAN, supra 
note 20, at 167–68. 
 92 Klarman, supra note 45, at 445. 
 93 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 453–54 (2004) [hereinafter “KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW 
TO CIVIL RIGHTS”]; see also KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 207 (“Once public opinion has 
shifted overwhelmingly in favor and many more states have enacted gay marriage, the 
Court will constitutionalize the emerging consensus and suppress resisting outliers.  That 
is simply how constitutional law works in the United States.”); Klarman, supra note 45, at 
450–51 (discussing various justices’ “strong sensitivity to public opinion”). 
 94 KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 202–07. 
 95 Jane S. Schacter, Making Sense of the Marriage Debate, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1193–94 (2013) 
(reviewing KLARMAN, supra note 20).  Klarman acknowledges that his thinking on the sub-
ject changed and developed between his works.  KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 223. 
 96 Klarman, supra note 45, at 482. (“By outpacing public opinion on issues of social reform, 
such rulings [like Goodridge and Lawrence] mobilize opponents, undercut moderates, and 
retard the cause they purport to advance.”).  It is important to note that Lawrence did not 
outpace public opinion because it legalized homosexual sodomy, but because it was pop-
ularly associated with same-sex marriage, which was at the time largely unsupported.  Id. 
at 459; Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-
rights.aspx (tracking polling results across time and finding that approximately 40% of 
respondents in 2003 supported same-sex marriage, while 60% opposed it). 
 97 KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 218 (“On balance, litigation has probably advanced the cause 
of gay marriage more than it has retarded it.”). 
 98 Id. at 219. 
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Most recently, in an interview after the Obergefell decision came 
out, Klarman expressed doubt that there would be any serious back-
lash to the ruling.99  He argued that Obergefell will largely dodge back-
lash for four reasons: (1) it is congruent with public opinion toward 
marriage equality, (2) it does not directly impact the lives of oppo-
nents, (3) the national Republican party has grown less likely to en-
dorse isolated resistance to same-sex marriage,100 and (4) circumvent-
ing implementation will be difficult.101  This more recent backlash 
iteration wisely discards any notion that resistance to judicial rulings 
might arise from an inherent, popularly held view of courts as non-
democratic institutions; rather, it substantially relies on any given de-
cision’s congruence with public opinion.102 
Finally, prominent backlash author William Eskridge takes per-
haps the least critical outlook on the same-sex marriage litigation 
strategy.103  His backlash framework distinguishes between (1) “nor-
mal politics,” which are the lowest stakes and involve consequentialist 
assessments of proposed policies, (2) “identity politics,” which impli-
cate “small ‘c’ constitutional issues,” or those that are especially rele-
vant to our personal values, and (3) “the politics of disgust,” which 
are the highest stakes and deal with issues that trigger highly nega-
tive, deeply rooted feelings like “disgust and contagion.”104 
 
 99 Rick Shenkman, Why Liberals Shouldn’t Worry About a Backlash to the Same-Sex Marriage Rul-
ing: An Interview with Harvard’s Michael Klarman, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (July 3, 2015), 
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/159870 (quoting Professor Klarman’s argument 
that “Obergefell probably will not elicit anything like the political backlash ignited by other 
landmark Court rulings, such as Brown, Furman, and Roe”).  Klarman also made a similar 
prediction in an article after the release of his book but before the decision.  See Michael 
Klarman, A Gay Marriage Backlash? Not Likely, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/24/opinion/la-oe-klarman-scotus-and-gay-
marriage-20130324 (“[W]hile a broad marriage equality ruling would undoubtedly gen-
erate some backlash, its scope would be far less than that ignited by Brown or Roe.”). 
100 Klarman seems to use this point to argue that Obergefell will manage to avoid resistance in 
the Deep South, despite pockets of less-than-favorable public opinion, presumably by 
guaranteeing that defiant actions on the part of local leaders will be largely unsupported 
by the broader party, and thus too politically costly in the long-term to pursue.  See 
Shenkman, supra note 99. 
101 Id. 
102 Though Klarman’s preceding set of factors seems to present several independent sources 
of backlash, I argue that they cannot be separated from one another so neatly.  Contrary 
to what such lists of discrete factors imply, it simply is not possible to sever any of these 
factors from Klarman’s first factor, as a decision’s congruence with public opinion is the 
driving force underlying the potential backlash it will face.  The remaining factors are 
simply more nuanced, highly specific approaches to the first.  See infra Part III. 
103 See generally Eskridge, supra note 21, at 309–23 (listing several positive effects of the same-
sex marriage litigation strategy for the movement, while nevertheless cautioning courts to 
proceed incrementally). 
104 Id. at 292–94. 
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Like Klarman’s most recent framework, Eskridge’s concept of 
backlash attributes resistance, at a base level, to a decision’s incom-
patibility with public opinion, though Eskridge puts more emphasis 
on the strength of opinions across the population than previously ex-
plored approaches.  Whereas the stakes are low and the potential for 
backlash is absent in normal politics, the higher the political stakes 
surrounding a policy issue (moving from identity politics to the poli-
tics of disgust) the more intense and harmful to the policy the poten-
tial backlash will be, regardless of the institution taking action on the 
issue.105  Courts are the most likely institution to inspire backlash 
simply because of their propensity to issue holdings that settle a mat-
ter for one side and against another, rather than reaching the type of 
political compromise usually sought by legislators.106  Such final deci-
sions, especially with regard to newly emerging, divisive political 
groups, heighten political stakes, inspiring politics of disgust by mak-
ing the losing side feel alienated from politics.107  Thus, while 
Eskridge applauds the marriage-equality litigation movement’s pro-
gress, he cautions against litigation decisions that declare a clear win-
ner, instead calling for a more incremental jurisprudence that lowers 
the stakes of politics to avoid harmful backlash.108 
III.  OBERGEFELL’S BACKLASH 
Those who are anxious about backlash have little to fear from the 
Court’s holding in Obergefell v. Hodges.  Though it was an historic rul-
ing that is already being characterized as the Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion of the marriage-equality movement,109 the backlash literature in-
dicates that, unlike Brown, Obergefell will not face massive resistance.  
This Part will draw from common themes throughout the previously 
 
105 Id. at 279.  Eskridge’s attempt to distinguish more harmful forms of backlash from less 
harmful forms (i.e. those associated with “the politics of disgust” and “identity politics,” 
respectively) seems to be, at least in part, directed toward circumventing Post and Siegel’s 
critique of Eskridge’s former work as being too juricentric, and thus discounting back-
lash’s capacity to facilitate productive constitutional dialogue.  See Post & Siegel, supra 
note 78, at 396–401.  Whether he accurately assesses the propensity of backlash to be so 
harmful that it undermines constitutional dialogue is a compelling question, and one 
that merits further exploration elsewhere. 
106 Eskridge, supra note 21, at 279 (“Although judicially recognized equality is not always 
more divisive than legislatively recognized equality, there is a particular danger that judg-
es will move too fast in response to legitimate demands by the despised minority.”). 
107 Id. at 292–96. 
108 Id. at 321–22. 
109 Corydon Ireland, Christina Pazzanese & Alvin Powell, One for the Ages, HARV. GAZETTE 
(June 26, 2015), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2015/06/one-for-the-ages/. 
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examined backlash scholarship to explain why a large-scale backlash 
is unlikely.  As the previous Part revealed, two common strands of 
reasoning used to explain backlash wind throughout the literature: 
the public opinion strand and the democratic legitimacy strand.  This 
Part will briefly explore each strand, concluding with an analysis of 
how they affect the predicted backlash post-Obergefell. 
A.  The Public Opinion Strand 
The first theme throughout the literature, which I refer to as “the 
public opinion strand,” attributes backlash to the judicial tendency, 
due to greater insulation from political accountability than the other 
branches, to make decisions that stretch too far afield of public opin-
ion, thereby inspiring popular resistance.  Though this strand is the 
most salient and nuanced in the backlash theories of Klarman and 
Eskridge, it is prevalent throughout all of the literature.  At the risk of 
being overly reductive, this factor does most of the analytical legwork 
in each of the backlash theories previously discussed. 
To illustrate, though Klarman’s latest set of backlash factors seems 
to present several independent sources of potential backlash, each 
factor is inseparable from, and in fact functions through, his first fac-
tor—public opinion.110  For example, Klarman’s treatment of his se-
cond factor, “direct impact on the lives of opponents,” has more to 
do with the strength of public opinion on the policy-opposing side 
than actual policy impact.  While there is no doubt, as Klarman ar-
gues, that Brown had a direct, tangible effect on many Southern 
whites by attempting to desegregate schools that their children at-
tended,111 it is much harder to make the same claim for Roe.  Yet 
Klarman claims that Roe directly affected opponents because they 
“regard [abortion] as murder.”112  This sounds like an appraisal of the 
strength of opinion among the opposition, rather than a tangible di-
rect effect on them.  To put it another way, nobody is forcing pro-
lifers or their relatives to obtain or endorse abortions.  Thus, Roe had 
no direct effects on abortion opponents in the sense that Brown direct-
ly affected the lives of segregationists with school-aged children.  Ra-
 
110 See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.  Most recently, Klarman argued that Ober-
gefell will largely dodge backlash for four reasons: (1) it is congruent with public opinion 
toward marriage equality, (2) it does not directly impact the lives of opponents, (3) the 
national Republican party has grown less likely to endorse isolated resistance to same-sex 
marriage, and (4) circumventing implementation will be difficult.  Shenkman, supra note 
99. 
111 Shenkman, supra note 99. 
112 Id. 
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ther, Roe had a perceived effect on opponents because of the strength 
of their conviction that “abortion is murder.”  In the same vein, Brown 
could also be explained by reference to the perceived effect rather 
than (or, in addition to) the direct one.  Thus, one might more simp-
ly describe the “direct effect” factor as a more nuanced look at a sin-
gle aspect of public opinion.113 
Likewise, Klarman’s third factor, in this case the national Republi-
can Party’s decreased likelihood to endorse isolated resistance to 
same-sex marriage, has a fairly clear relationship with national public 
opinion.  Where the national party establishment recognizes a losing 
battle in the public opinion realm, it will be reluctant to pour re-
sources into isolated political clashes against the nationally favored 
policy, even where the policy is highly disfavored on the local level.114  
Thus, the party establishment support factor can also be described as 
a more specific public opinion inquiry. 
Finally, contrary to what Klarman’s fourth factor implies, the ca-
pacity to circumvent implementation,115 like his other factors, is simp-
ly a function of whether and to what degree the decision contravenes 
public opinion.  Specifically, those in positions of power will only re-
fuse to implement decisions where there is sufficient popular support 
for doing so.  This is true for both technical and direct non-
compliance, though the relative political costs of each may call for a 
higher degree of policy-opposing public opinion for a politician to 
choose the latter.  Nevertheless, it is hard to conceive of any public 
policy where difficulty associated with resisting implementation 
would foreclose popularly supported resistance to such implementa-
tion without envisioning a radically different government structure 
than what the United States currently has.  Therefore, like the “direct 
effect” element, Klarman’s implementation factor, though nuanced, 
can be simplified as a derivative of the backlash predictor that really 
does the analytical heavy lifting: public opinion. 
B.  The Democratic Legitimacy Strand 
The second theme, which I refer to as “the democratic legitimacy 
strand,” explains judicial backlash as a product of a supposedly popu-
lar perception of courts as lacking democratic legitimacy (and there-
fore also the authority to issue far-reaching policies that ought to 
 
113 Klarman has acknowledged the role of strength of public opinion elsewhere.  See 
KLARMAN, supra note 88, at 172–74. 
114 See Shenkman, supra note 99; see also supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
115 Shenkman, supra note 99. 
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have been deliberated on by politically accountable legislators).  This 
view is present primarily in Rosenberg’s work,116 though it also lingers 
in the background of Klarman’s older backlash theory,117 and it re-
mains a favorite theme of dissenting justices.118 
Standing in stark contrast to the public opinion strand within the 
literature, the democratic legitimacy strand has been largely aban-
doned by the most recent treatments of backlash, and for good rea-
son.  The idea that controversial political decisions should be enacted 
through popular will, rather than at the whim of appointed judges, 
has intuitive appeal.  Yet this outlook is at odds with a substantial 
body of literature arguing that people actually prefer courts to decide 
major constitutional issues over other governmental bodies.119 
Moreover, though the concept of a democratic institutional pref-
erence is enticing to American sensibilities, common sense endorses 
the simpler conclusion that people care less about the source of a 
governmental decision than its substance.120  A recent empirical ex-
amination bolsters this premise, finding that people will disapprove 
of decisions they disagree with from a policy perspective and agree 
with those that match their personal views, regardless of whether the 
decision comes from the judiciary or the legislature.121  Put another 
way, just as “judicial activism flouts the popular will” offers an attrac-
tive narrative, so too does “legislature gets it wrong due to partisan 
stalemate.”  The narrative one endorses will be driven not by beliefs 
regarding the institution, but rather by personal views on the decision 
which that institution reached.122  This is true for people on both 
sides of the aisle.123  Thus, while “judicial activism” provides an attrac-
tive rhetorical attack on court decisions that one finds adverse, there 
is no evidence to suggest that it achieves any real backlash effect on 
its own.124  Cries of “judicial activism” are a symptom, rather than a 
cause, of backlash.  The people who subscribe to the “judicial activ-
 
116 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
118 See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text (collecting portions of Obergefell dissents that 
echo the democratic legitimacy theme). 
119 See Fontana & Braman, supra note 91, at 739–40 (listing literature in support of pro-Court 
institutional preference). 
120 See Post & Siegel, supra note 78, at n.91 (opining that “the common sense of the matter is 
surely to the contrary” regarding the democratic legitimacy backlash rationale). 
121 Fontana & Braman, supra note 91, at 758–61 (explaining that experimental results show 
that “beliefs about the competence of the institutions themselves are contingent, in sig-
nificant part, on whether the institution delivers an outcome that a subject favors”). 
122 Id. at 758. 
123 Id. at 760. 
124 Id. at 741, 766, 789. 
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ism” argument do so because they already disagree with the opinion’s 
substance, not because of strong preexisting attitudes toward the ju-
dicial institution. 
Applying this insight to Obergefell, despite the grave warnings of 
the dissenting justices, the Court’s decision to “[steal] this issue from 
the people” will not “cast a cloud over same-sex marriage” that is any 
different from the cloud that would have been cast had the legisla-
ture made the same decision.125  The institution making the decision 
does not create the storm cloud; the substance of the decision does.  
The institution simply affects the cloud’s location, whether that be 
over the Supreme Court, the Capitol Building, or the White House.  
For same-sex marriage opponents, the “dramatic social change”126 
arising from this policy would have been difficult to accept, regardless 
of its source. 
C.  Public Opinion and Obergefell 
The democratic legitimacy strand’s fall from favor does not mean 
that courts do not offer a unique source of backlash.  As the first 
strand from the literature provides, judicial backlash does not arise 
from public opinion rejecting the court, but rather from the court re-
jecting public opinion.  To be clear, courts do not typically reject 
public opinion intentionally; however, because judges tend to be the 
least politically accountable officeholders, they have the lowest incen-
tive to stay up to speed.127  Even more importantly, institutional orien-
tation and demographic skewing make judges highly likely to hold 
views that differ from those of the general population.128 
Does it follow that the judiciary is always doomed to incur back-
lash when it rules on issues about which there are strong public opin-
ions?129  Clearly not.  Where a court makes an effort to stay sensitive to 
 
125 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
126 Id. 
127 KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 169–70.  Klarman notes that this holds true not only for ap-
pointed judges, but also for elected judges (though to a lesser extent), because they 
“stand for reelection less frequently than do legislators.”  Id. at 169. 
128 Id. at 170 (noting that judges are members of the educational, socioeconomic, and legal 
elite, predisposing them to have more liberal views, especially “on issues such as gender 
equality and gay equality”); id. at 171 (“Judges may advance beyond public opinion on is-
sues such as gay marriage . . .[in part] because they function within an institution that 
operates according to different norms than the political system does.”). 
129 The question is posed in this manner to acknowledge that the vast majority of court deci-
sions (even from the Supreme Court) do not touch upon subjects about which the Amer-
ican public has taken positions, as these decisions usually have few or no effects that 
reach beyond resolving the adjudicated conflict (especially in the case of lower courts), 
and even when the rulings do have policy implications, they are often limited to specific 
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public attitudes, it can choose to issue decisions that will not incur 
significant backlash.  Indeed, the Supreme Court rarely departs far 
from public opinion,130 though where it has, the most memorable 
cases of backlash in American history have followed.131  Thus, the Su-
preme Court has good reason to tread lightly when dealing with sen-
sitive public opinion issues. 
This is probably why its handling of Obergefell has been so careful.  
With Roe v. Wade in the rear-view mirror,132 the Court chose to pursue 
“a jurisprudence of minimalist incrementalism,”133 issuing decisions 
that advanced the cause of marriage equality steadily, without getting 
too far ahead of public opinion.134  Thus, when Obergefell was decided, 
approximately 60% of the American public fell in favor of same-sex 
marriage.135  Moreover, the intensity of public opinion favoring same-
sex marriage had grown to match and even exceed the strength of 
beliefs held by the opposition.136  This level of current support, com-
 
contexts (e.g. court procedural rules).  See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard 
Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313, 323–24 (2009) (examining the Supreme Court’s 1983–1993 terms 
and concluding, using a variety of measures, that an average of only fifteen cases per term 
fell within the “high-profile” category). 
130 See KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 449 (“The justices reflect 
dominant public opinion too much for them to protect truly oppressed groups.”). 
131 See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 78 (discussing various backlash approaches used to 
explain popular resistance to Roe and Brown). 
132 See, e.g., Jonathan Bullington, Justice Ginsburg: Roe v. Wade Not ‘Woman-Centered”, CHI. 
TRIB. (May 11, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-11/news/chi-justice-
ginsburg-roe-v-wade-not-womancentered-20130511_1_roe-v-abortion-related-cases-wade-
case (reporting on Justice Ginsburg’s worries that the Supreme Court moved too fast with 
Roe, inciting major backlash); see also Greg Stohr & Matthew Winkler, Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
Thinks Americans Are Ready for Gay Marriage, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-12/ginsburg-says-u-s-ready-to-accept-
ruling-approving-gay-marriage-i61z6gq2 (describing Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, before 
the Obergefell ruling, that it “‘would not take a large adjustment’ for Americans should the 
justices say that gay marriage is a constitutional right”). 
133 Nan D. Hunter, A Deer in the Headlights: The Supreme Court, LGBT Rights, and Equal Protec-
tion, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1121, 1131 (2015). 
134 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (refusing to rule on same-sex marriage 
but leaving it legal in California); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (de-
claring DOMA unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring sod-
omy laws unconstitutional). 
135 See McCarthy, supra note 14 (demonstrating that public opinion in support of gay mar-
riage remained stable after Obergefell, thus implying that the decision did not outpace 
public opinion on the issue). 
136 See Gary Langer, Support for Gay Marriage Reaches Record High, ABC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2015, 
7:18 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/support-gay-marriage-reaches-record-high/
story?id=30507803 (“‘[S]trong’ support for allowing gay marriage exceeds strong opposi-
tion by 15 percentage points . . . . In a similar question in 2004, by contrast, strong oppo-
sition exceeded strong support by 34 points.”). 
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bined with the continual positive trend in public attitude toward mar-
riage equality, means that Obergefell will incite little or no backlash. 
While this is a simple conclusion, it fulfills the many nuanced fac-
tors employed in the literature.  Excluding predictors based in no-
tions of democratic legitimacy backlash, under Rosenberg’s rudimen-
tary backlash analysis,137 the Supreme Court has avoided massive 
backlash by keeping its decisions in line with public opinion.  Like-
wise, under Klarman’s former analysis,138 backlash will be avoided be-
cause (1) the decision is congruent with public opinion, (2) salience 
is already high on the issue, and (3) the Court, by proceeding incre-
mentally, has avoided drastically changing the order of social reform.  
Using Klarman’s more recent analysis,139 favorable public opinion en-
sures that avoiding implementation, no matter how easy this might 
be, will not be politically expedient, especially because the public 
opinion trend essentially guarantees that resistors will not get party 
support on the national level.  Without party support of resistance, 
which arises from public opinion endorsing such resistance, signifi-
cant backlash will not even occur in geographically isolated locations 
with majority opposition to marriage equality.  Finally, under 
Eskridge’s framework,140 by pursuing incremental progress toward 
marriage equality rather than declaring a winner when the issue first 
appeared in front of the Justices in 2013, the Supreme Court allowed 
the positive growth in public views on same-sex marriage to continue.  
The Supreme Court not only lowered the stakes with its Windsor rul-
ing, but also signaled to lower courts how to proceed on the question, 
allowing the issue to advance at its own pace, district by district and 
state by state, diffusing any would-be backlash. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
The foregoing analysis poses two important questions with regard 
to the efficacy of pursuing social change through litigation.  First, if 
the Supreme Court must track public opinion to avoid backlash, 
doesn’t that interfere with its duty to vindicate constitutional rights?  
The short answer to this question is: not necessarily.  The legacy of 
same-sex marriage litigation, especially between Windsor and Oberge-
fell, illustrates how the judiciary can aggressively pursue a policy 
agenda without clashing with public opinion at the Supreme Court 
 
137 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
139 See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. 
140 See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
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level.  Though Windsor advanced the marriage-equality cause directly 
by invalidating DOMA, it also facilitated progress indirectly by signal-
ing the Supreme Court’s policy preferences to lower courts, trigger-
ing a cascade of favorable precedent that significantly advanced the 
cause by the time Obergefell emerged two years later.141  Thus, to use 
Klarman’s words, in Obergefell the Supreme Court once again “consti-
tutionalized consensus and suppressed outliers.”142  This time, howev-
er, it was the judiciary that helped create the consensus in the first 
place, with lower courts legalizing marriage in twenty-two states be-
tween Windsor and Obergefell.143 
This highlights the potentially important role of state and district 
courts in facilitating social movement progress.  Though Baehr led to 
a massive backlash that, at the time, seemed to hurt more than help 
the same-sex marriage cause, it also moved a previously radical idea 
into the realm of possibility, influencing the movement’s entire 
agenda and setting into motion a sequence of events that would par-
allel steadily increasing positive attitudes toward same-sex marriage.144  
“Put simply, there is little reason to believe people would have been 
talking about, thinking about, or warming up to same-sex marriage 
this much or this quickly had the court decisions not so dramatically 
put the issue on the public radar screen and begun a public dia-
logue.”145 
Cases like Baehr and Goodridge, along with the many lower court 
cases between Windsor and Obergefell, also give credence to the idea 
that not all backlash is bad backlash.  Previous literature has recog-
nized the utility of backlash for facilitating constitutional dialogue,146 
yet this dialogue can also be beneficial from a juricentric perspective.  
In other words, backlash can not only benefit constitutional legitima-
cy generally by involving the public in a constitutional dialogue, it can 
also benefit the specific aims of a litigation campaign.  For instance, 
where backlash raises the salience of a previously unfamiliar issue, 
causing the public to form opinions, it can contribute to the long-
term progress of a social movement.147  Because of courts’ rights-
protection orientation, they will often represent an emerging group’s 
best chance at governmental and public recognition, in a sense forc-
 
141 See Watts, supra note 68, at S74–S77. 
142 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
144 Eskridge, supra note 21, at 310–11; see also supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
145 Schacter, supra note 41, at 1220. 
146 Post & Siegel, supra note 78, at 398. 
147 Eskridge, supra note 21, at 311. 
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ing governmental institutions and the public in general to 
acknowledge, rather than ignore, the emerging group, even when the 
group starts out on the fringes of society. 
The discussion from Part III poses an additional question: if the 
Supreme Court is bound by public opinion, will it ever be more effec-
tive than legislatures at creating social change?  The answer to this is 
an unequivocal yes.  The scope of action defined by public opinion 
acts as a restraint on all political branches: get too far behind public 
opinion and risk irrelevancy, but get too far ahead and face the spec-
ter of backlash.  Not all branches are equally constrained within this 
zone of action, however.  Though the branches will often mirror each 
other, an adept Supreme Court can act more quickly than a legisla-
ture within this public opinion window. 
Even where public opinion favoring a policy exists at a sufficient 
level to render backlash unlikely, national politics and legislator con-
cerns about outlying constituencies can operate to slow the legislative 
process.148  The Supreme Court does not share these constraints.  
Though political leaders of outlier districts have little motivation to 
work toward an unpopular policy in the legislature, neither do they 
have a sufficient political incentive to fight a court ruling imposing 
the policy when they will be unsupported on the national level.  It is 
much easier to reluctantly accede to the Supreme Court’s ruling, as 
many state leaders did in the wake of Obergefell, than to independently 
fight a losing political battle.149  Thus, the same weakness of the Court 
that arises from its lack of direct political accountability can serve as 
the strength of a more aware Court that keeps its finger on the pulse 
of public opinion. 
 
148 This is by no means an exhaustive list of potential legislative hindrances.  See, e.g., Steven 
Hill & Robert Richie, Why America Can’t Pass Gun Control, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/12/why-america-cant-pass-gun-
control/266417/ (asserting that gun control measures do not gain traction in Congress 
largely because of the influence the NRA holds with a small number of constituents lo-
cated in swing congressional districts); Sarah Binder, How Political Polarization Creates 
Stalemate and Undermines Lawmaking, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Jan. 13, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/13/how-political-
polarization-creates-stalemate-and-undermines-lawmaking/ (emphasizing the role of po-
litical polarization in creating deadlock within Congress); Aaron Belkin, Filibuster Reform 
Will Result in a More Responsive Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013),  
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/22/a-change-in-rules-on-filibusters-
and-its-impact-on-congress/filibuster-reform-will-result-in-a-more-responsive-congress (de-
scribing how the partisan use of “the filibuster has allowed minority factions to block pol-
icies that public majorities support” and how “filibusters have frozen federal policies”). 
149 See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
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Despite possessing the potential to act as a catalyst for social 
change, the Supreme Court takes a substantial risk whenever it does 
so.  If it misjudges public opinion, it may take an action that attracts 
serious backlash.  However, by acting too slowly, the Court may allow 
ongoing constitutional violations, assuming the Court sees the issue 
as such.  These violations will often be a necessary cost of moving at a 
speed that does not incur backlash, allowing the Court to take care 
and perhaps pursue a minimalist jurisprudence that allows lower 
courts to take the lead role in forging forward and cultivating public 
support, as was done here.  While the actions of the lower courts 
serve to mitigate such constitutional violations, the Supreme Court 
nevertheless has an incentive to decide the case as soon as the pru-
dent desire to avoid backlash allows, vindicating the constitutional 
rights of all citizens—even those in places where lower courts refuse 
to push the ball forward.  Thus, where the Supreme Court wishes to 
usher in social change, it has the difficult job of balancing between 
the political reality of backlash and the judicial duty to vindicate con-
stitutional rights.  For Obergefell, time will show not only that the Court 
acted within this public opinion window, but also that it influenced 
the size of the window by indirectly pushing its policy aims through 
lower courts, allowing them to lead the charge and diffuse future 
backlash. 
CONCLUSION 
The Obergefell legacy has much to teach backlash scholars, social 
movement advocates, and the judiciary.  For scholars, Obergefell cau-
tions against categorical pronouncements regarding causes and ef-
fects of backlash.  The analysis of backlash presented here seeks to 
both focus the backlash causal inquiry and direct future scholarship 
toward searching out the many nuanced contextual factors that influ-
ence public opinion in any given case. 
Obergefell also poses to scholars the wider question of the degree to 
which the actions of courts and litigators in the same-sex marriage 
campaign can be useful in other contexts.  Admittedly, the foregoing 
analysis glosses over many of the somewhat unique social and political 
trends underlying the movement toward marriage equality.150  
Though I contend that the developments that this analysis points out, 
especially with regards to Supreme Court jurisprudential strategy, can 
 
150 See KLARMAN, supra note 20 (providing a nuanced, holistic treatment of the marriage-
equality movement that examines many of these trends). 
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be carried over to other contexts, I leave open the question of the 
conditions required—for example, the degree to which lower courts 
must be sympathetic to the Supreme Court’s agenda—to facilitate the 
use of such a strategy across circumstances. 
For advocates, the Obergefell story suggests that, far from being a 
“hollow hope,” the pursuit of a litigation campaign can bolster the 
status of a social movement, both through favorable rulings and 
through extrajudicial effects, for example raising the salience of pre-
viously unexamined issues.  Though litigation runs the risk of causing 
resistance, the backlash it inspires will not necessarily be detrimental 
in the long term; litigation can still serve as the backbone of a highly 
effective social movement as it did in the fight for marriage equality. 
Finally, Obergefell shows that the judicial branch can act as a potent 
facilitator of social change.  Though the Supreme Court is con-
strained by public opinion, it is less constrained than the other 
branches; moreover, it has the limited ability to circumvent this con-
straint by signaling its policy preferences to lower courts.  Obergefell’s 
largely peaceful aftermath will underscore these lessons, restoring the 
hope of those who put faith in the judiciary’s ability to effectively ad-
vance the protection of constitutional rights, even where social 
change is necessary to do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
